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Consumer redemption behavior pertaining to coupons, gift certificates, product sampling, rebates, and the like, has
been the focus of much scholarly inquiry and the extant literature has documented two noteworthy empirical
regularities - a bump in redemptions close to offer expiry and greater redemption with shorter redemption windows. In
the extant work, these phenomena have been explained by invoking myopic consumers. Against this backdrop, we ask
a simple question: can these phenomena survive if we assume rational, forward-looking consumers? Accordingly, we
develop a model consisting exclusively of forward-looking consumers and incorporate two constructs highlighted in the
literature - forgetting and stochastic redemption costs. We derive consumers' period-by-period redemption rule and
subsequently illustrate the emergence of the two aforementioned empirical regularities.
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1. Introduction
Consumers often find themselves in a position where they can redeem marketing offers such as
coupons, gift certificates, invitations to partake in product sampling, rebates, etc. Not surprisingly,
consumer redemption behavior has received a fair amount of research attention and the literature
has documented two empirical regularities – a bump close to offer expiry and greater redemption
with shorter redemption windows. Specifically, with respect to the bump, Inman and McAlister
(1994) incorporate regret theory to examine redemption behavior as the coupon approaches expira-
tion. A key premise of their research is that consumers are myopic in that they do not anticipate or
respond to the regret until they experience it. In their empirical work, Inman and McAlister (1994)
analyze coupon redemption patterns for various brands in the spaghetti sauce category and find that
they do indeed exhibit a bump close to expiry. Similarly, Groupon redemptions also show a bump
close to expiry (Gupta, Weaver and Rood 2012). With respect to redemption windows, Shu and
Gneezy (2010) hypothesize and empirically find that redemption rates are higher when consumers
are assigned to shorter redemption windows. In their conceptualization, Shu and Gneezy (2010)
build on resource slack theory (Zauberman and Lynch 2005) which suggests greater discounting of
time investments relative to money investments. Such systematic underweighting of effort has also
been discussed in Akerlof (1991). Another conceptualization utilized by Shu and Gneezy (2010)
is temporal construal theory (Trope and Liberman 2003) which examines how non-monetary costs
and benefits are treated in the short run and in the long run. This theory suggests that individuals
tend to focus on the desirability aspects of a task in the long run, but then switch to a focus on
the feasibility aspects of the task as it actually approaches. Again, it is the consumer’s myopic
perception of his/her behavior in distant periods that leads to the empirical regularity of greater
redemption associated with shorter redemption windows.
While these are very interesting explanations, they nevertheless beg the question: how can such
phenomena persist over time as consumers come to learn about their myopia? Another way to ask
the same question is whether such phenomena will ever emerge with rational, forward-looking
consumers. Accordingly, our primary contribution to the literature is to develop a model that
demonstrates how the two aforementioned empirical regularities can arise even in a world consist-
ing exclusively of forward-looking consumers. In spirit, our work is closest to that of Gilpatric
(2009) who examines the impact of the distribution of forward-looking consumers on rebate re-
demptions. Taken together, these two works deepen our understanding of consumer redemption
behavior.
In our model, we include two constructs identified in the literature: forgetting and stochastic
redemption costs. The notion of forgetting has a rich history in many communication models where
consumers forget messages delivered to them. (See, for example, Keller (1987), who highlights
the endemic problem of consumers’ memory performance in the context of advertising, and Tellis
(1998), who discusses the notion of less than perfect carry-over for advertising investments.) We
also believe that stochastic redemption costs are an integral aspect of consumer behavior, an idea
highlighted by O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999). (See also Chen, Moorthy and Zhang (2005), who
utilize a stochastic specification for consumers’ marginal utility for money.)
2. Model Setup
We consider a cohort of consumers who in period 1 receive a marketing offer (coupon, gift cer-
tificate, invitation to partake in product sampling, rebate) of value x that expires in period N . We
make the following key assumptions.
A1: Forgetting. A consumer in possession of the offer faces the possibility that he/she forgets,
misplaces, or loses the offer as he/she crosses from one period to the next. We assume
that the probability that the consumer will remember the offer is ρ ∈ [0, 1]; conversely, the
probability that he/she will forget the offer is 1 − ρ. The forgotten offer cannot be recalled
at a future time.
A2: Stochastic Redemption Costs. Redeeming the offer is costly. We assume that this cost varies
stochastically across the periods. In every period, each consumer learns his/her redemption
cost c that is drawn from a continuous distribution F (·) with support [c, c].
A3: Forward-Looking Consumers. All the parameters of the model, x, N , ρ and F (·) are known
to the consumers. We assume that the offer is such that x ≥ c. When a consumer redeems the
offer, his/her utility is the difference between x and the realized redemption cost. Thus, the
consumer may strategically postpone redeeming the offer to take advantage of the possibility
of a lower cost realization in the future. For simplicity, we assume there is no discounting
between periods.
3. Analysis
Consumer decision-making can be characterized by a set of thresholds c1, c2, . . . cN . When a
consumer arrives in period n and the offer has not yet been redeemed or forgotten, the consumer
redeems the offer if and only if his/her realized redemption cost does not exceed cn.
We begin our analysis with the last period. In period N , the consumer redeems the offer as
long as the realized cost does not exceed x:
cN = min{x, c}.






(x− c) dF (c).
In the next to last period, period N − 1, the consumer compares x − c with ρVN and redeems
the offer if and only if x− c ≥ ρVN , or c ≤ x− ρVN . Hence,
cN−1 = min{x− ρVN , c}.
We then calculate period N − 1 value function, which incorporates the consumer’s optimal re-














(x− c) dF (c) + (1− F (cN−1))ρVN .
Continuing with backward induction, we obtain the sets of thresholds {cn} and value functions
{Vn}, n = 1, 2, . . . N . The results are summarized in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1. Among consumers in possession of the offer in period n, only those with the cost
realizations below cn will redeem the offer in that period. The set of thresholds {cn} can be
calculated recursively, with the initial condition
{





(x− c) dF (c).
and the formula {





(x− c) dF (c) + (1− F (cn−1))ρVn.
Corollary 1. Consumers become less stringent as the expiration date of the offer approaches:
c1 ≤ c2 ≤ . . . ≤ cN .
For the proof of Corollary 1, consider a consumer in possession of the offer in period n. This
consumer can do at least as well as a consumer in possession of the offer in period n+1 by behaving
as if the offer expires one period earlier. This simple observation immediately implies that the value
function is higher in period n than in period n+1, Vn ≥ Vn+1. Since cn−1 = min{x− ρVn, c} and
cn = min{x− ρVn+1, c}, we have cn−1 ≤ cn for all n.
Intuitively, consumers are more demanding early on because there are still ample opportunities
to realize a low redemption cost. However, as periods go by, the chances to draw a good redemption
cost diminish, thereby causing a consumer to be less likely to delay redemption.
We now calculate the number of redemptions in each period n, which we denote by pn, n =





1 dF (c) = F (c1).



















1 dF (c) = ρ(1− F (c1))F (c2).



























1 dF (c) = ρ2(1− F (c1))(1− F (c2))F (c3).
We have the following proposition.
Proposition 2. The number of redemptions in period n is given by
pn =
{





(1− F (ck)), if n ≥ 2.
In the remainder of the paper, we use the preceding analysis to investigate consumer redemption
behavior. Our primary objective in this endeavor is to demonstrate that it is possible to obtain the
two aforementioned redemption patterns – a bump at expiry and greater redemption with shorter
redemption windows – exclusively with forward-looking consumers. Another objective is to pro-
vide some intuition for the emergence of these phenomena. To facilitate meeting these objectives,
we restrict our attention to x ≥ c.
A4: Offer Attractiveness. The offer is sufficiently attractive in that x ≥ c.
For redemption costs, we consider three distributions from the beta family: B(0.4, 0.2), B(0.2, 0.4),
and B(1, 1). Their densities are depicted in Figure 1. Note that B(1, 1) corresponds to the uni-
form distribution, while the other two have more mass at the extremes. We include the uniform
distribution for completeness but expect the distribution of redemption costs to be bi-modal and
asymmetric. The distribution B(0.4, 0.2) depicts a world where the likelihood of extremely large
redemption costs is more pronounced than the likelihood of extremely low redemption costs. The
distribution B(0.2, 0.4) depicts the reverse. Our expectation for this last distribution is generally
consistent with the distribution found for other traits such as intelligence, wherein there is a second
mass of highly gifted individuals (Burt 1963).
Suppose N = 4, ρ = 0.95 and x = 1.2. For each of the three distributions we calculate {cn}





results are recorded in Table 1. We see that in all three cases {cn} is an increasing sequence, as it
should be (Corollary 1). Under assumption A4, the consumer in possession of the offer in period
N redeems it irrespective of the realized cost, cN = c. This explains c4 = 1 in the table. As to
the redemption pattern {pn}, it is non-monotonic. In the case of B(0.4, 0.2), there is a bump in the
last period: p4 = 0.234 > p3 = 0.165 (shaded gray).
Table 1: N = 4, ρ = 0.95, x = 1.2
c1 c2 c3 c4 p1 p2 p3 p4 p
B(0.4, 0.2) 0.465 0.551 0.693 1.000 0.308 0.224 0.165 0.234 0.931
B(0.2, 0.4) 0.180 0.234 0.377 1.000 0.529 0.251 0.117 0.066 0.963
B(1, 1) 0.382 0.432 0.535 1.000 0.382 0.254 0.169 0.140 0.945















Figure 1: Probability Density Functions for B(0.4, 0.2), B(0.2, 0.4), B(1, 1)
If we decrease the probability of remembering the offer, the ending period bump under B(0.4, 0.2)
will get smaller. In Table 2, ρ = 0.85. We see that p4 = 0.140 is only slightly above p3 = 0.123
(shaded gray). The bump will completely disappear if we push ρ below 0.8.
Thus, we conclude that the ending period bump is present in the redemption pattern when: (i)
high values of c receive more weight under F (·), and (ii) the probability of remembering the offer is
close to one. Intuitively, more weight on high values of c and a higher probability of remembering
the offer increase the likelihood that the consumer arrives into the last period without redeeming
the offer. This leads to the ending period bump, as the consumer is forced to redeem.
If we drop assumption A4 (i.e., assume x ≥ c instead of x ≥ c), there will be fewer redemptions
in the final period because redemption may not provide positive value. This will obviate the bump.
It will also reduce the total number of redemptions, and therefore scale it to be more in line with
real-world redemption rates without impacting the essential calculus of our model dynamics for
those consumers described by x ≥ c. Overall, we note that our findings relate very well to offers
Table 2: N = 4, ρ = 0.85, x = 1.2
c1 c2 c3 c4 p1 p2 p3 p4 p
B(0.4, 0.2) 0.594 0.645 0.747 1.000 0.359 0.207 0.123 0.140 0.826
B(0.2, 0.4) 0.331 0.362 0.463 1.000 0.609 0.207 0.071 0.030 0.917
B(1, 1) 0.515 0.539 0.605 1.000 0.515 0.222 0.098 0.054 0.889
characterized by our analysis, e.g., Groupon offers. Groupon offers are very attractive (x ≥ c),
exhibit high redemption rates (total redemptions about 45%), and are characterized by a substantial
ending period bump (approximately 15%) – please see Figure B in Gupta, Weaver, and Rood
(2012).
Next, we want to study the effect of N on the total number of redemptions, p. We obtain
the remarkable result that the total number of redemptions is higher under shorter redemptions
windows for any F (·) and ρ.
Proposition 3. The total number of redemptions is higher under shorter redemption windows.
Consider two worlds that have the same F (·) and ρ, but differ in the number of periods: it is
N in one world and N + 1 in the other. To prove Proposition 3, we need to show that the total








N+1 denote the redemption cost thresholds


























Thus, as consumers journey across N periods in the N -period world, they face higher (less strin-
gent) redemption thresholds than their counterparts journeying across the first N periods in the
(N + 1)-period world. This fact, coupled with the facts that all surviving offers are redeemed in
the last period and the (N +1)-period world has one more chance for forgetting, yields the finding
that the total number of redemptions is greater in the N -period world.
Of course, offering a longer redemption window is good for consumers and enhances their
welfare. However, a longer redemption window results in a lower total number of redemptions
which may be at variance with the objectives of the entity making the offer (e.g., a firm attempting
to obtain initial product sampling).
4. Conclusion
Previous research on consumer redemption behavior has documented two noteworthy empirical
regularities – a bump close to offer expiry and greater redemption with shorter redemption win-
dows. In the extant work, these phenomena have been explained by invoking myopic consumers.
In contrast, we develop a model consisting exclusively of forward-looking consumers and demon-
strate the emergence of these phenomena for plausible parameter values. Our work thus reveals
how these phenomena may arise, and persist, even in the absence of consumer myopia.
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